The Cook County Pension Plan is a multi-billion dollar plan, with over 14,000 people currently dependent on it for sustenance, and an additional 25,000 on their way. As a result the pension pans continued sustainability and structural integrity are integral to the success of the County Board.
The Pension plan is not in a structurally solvent state. As of 2007, the unfunded liability of the Cook County Pension plan was 22.7%. Sadly, having over one-in-five dollars necessary for the pension unavailable is an improvement. If we look at the figures from 2006 and 2005, it was closer to one-in-four dollars:
| Year | Unfunded Liability | Growth/(Decrease) |
| 2005 | 24.2% / $2,242,435,995 | N/A |
| 2006 | 24.7% / $2,441,895,052 | 0.50% |
| 2007 | 22.7% / $2,363,850,096 | -2% |
This lack of full financing in others futures, however, is not the largest structural problem that we face in paying what we owe is the worker to employer ratio. At the national level, people discuss the danger for social security when we reach a two-to-one worker to recipient ratio. Unfortunately, at Cook County we are already substantially below a two-to-one worker to recipient ratio:
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Year Worker to Recipient Ratio Growth/(decrease) 2005 25,726/ 13,926=1.85/1 n/a 2006 25,555/ 14,173=1.8/1 -0.05 2007 23,456/ 14,469=1.62/1 -0.18
The above chart shows the danger, of the current employment pattern. As time continues, we can expect the ratio to continue to decrease. As a result of this, the county acquires a greater and greater dependency on employee contributions to ensure revenue:
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Year Employer Contributions Growth 2005 214,849,442 8.45% 2006 221,186,219 2.90% 2007 258,141, 230 16.70%
This pillaging of the pocketbook is of course made worse by the fact that the number of employees who are contributing to this program has been steadily decreasing since 2005, meaning that the per-person contribution has grown from approximately $8,000 in 2005 to approximately $11,000 in 2007.
Perhaps the greatest threat, however, to the soundness of the Pension Fund is not the structural inequities of its design, but its dependence on the stock market for annual revenue. Since 2005, almost half of the yearly revenue for the fund has come from Investment Revenue. From a low of forty-five to a high of sixty-three, investments have counted for the largest portion of the fund of any item over the past three years.
| Year | Revenues | Market Investment Revenue | Percentage of Total Revenue |
| 2005 | $720,772,635 | $323,245,508 | 45% |
| 2006 | $1,101,360,984 | $747,619,968 | 63% |
| 2007 | $868,685,564 | $474,758,212 | 54.65% |
This is a dangerous dependency on the whimsy of the market, as we have seen over the past year. On 1/2/08 the DOW closed at 13,043.96, whereas it has now dropped 5,254.4 points, and as of 1/7/09 closed at 7,789.56. This leads to a general depression in the amount of revenue available for the fund, and as a result leads to the aforementioned increase in the percentage of the employee contribution, as well as a new demand on the employee contribution.
Furthermore, one can see a direct correlation between the success of the investment and overall effectiveness of the fun. One can clearly see the importance of the fun, if you realize that the drop in the 2007 unfunded liability is approximately one-fifth the difference between market revenue of 2006 and 2005. Furthermore, those years that have had the most successful seen market growth, are also the ones that have seen the smallest increase in the Employee contribution.
| Year | Market Investment Revenue | Employee Contribution Growth |
| 2005 | $323,245,508 | 8.45% |
| 2006 | $747,619,968 | 2.90% |
| 2007 | $474,758,212 | 16.70% |
As a result of this, one can clearly see the danger that the County Pension Fund is currently in. The Funds Liability has yet to decrease to fewer than 20%–meaning that one-in-five dollars are still unpaid for. Furthermore, the structural soundness of guaranteeing 80% of an employee’s highest annual income after thirty years of service is a dangerous program, considering the decreasing worker to beneficiary ratio—which has seen a twenty-three percent decrease over the past three years. Furthermore, the county needs to be lead away from Market investments towards more continuously solvent, and regular means of fund management.
